Blog for Batch of SS-33 / Tech.-24 of Officers Training Acadamy
Monday, July 2, 2012
Remembering 2nd Lt. Arun Khetrapal, PVC (Posthumous)
During
the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the 17 Poona Horse was assigned to the command of the
47th Infantry Brigade of the Indian Army. Through the duration of the conflict,
the 47th Brigade saw action in the Shakargarh sector in the Battle of Basantar.
Among
the tasks set for the 47th Brigade was to establish a bridgehead across the
River Basantar. By 2100hr of 15 December, the brigade had captured its
objectives. However, the place was extensively mined, which prevented the
deployment of the tanks of the Poona horse, and the engineers clearing the
mines were halfway through their tasks when Indian troops at the bridge-head
reported alarming activity of the enemy armour, asking for immediate armour
support. It was at this critical juncture that the 17 Poona Horse decided to
push through the mine-field. The regiment was able to establish a link-up
between the armour and the infantry at the bridge-head by first light the next
day.
At
0800hr on 16 December, Pakistani armour launched the first of their
counter-attacks under the cover of a smokescreen at the pivot of the 17th Poona
Horse at Jarpal. Heavily outnumbered against Pakistani armour and infantry, the
commander of the "B" Squadron called for urgent reinforcements. This
call was taken up by 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, stationed close to the
squadron, with his detachment of two tanks and troops. Khetarpal wheeled to
meet the Pakistani armour and launched right into the Pakistani attack. With
his troop he was able to run over the enemy advance with his tanks and even
captured some of the enemy infantry and weapon crews at pistol-point! However,
the commander of the second tank was killed in this attack. Alone in charge,
Khetarpal continued his attack on the enemy strongholds until he had
overwhelmed the Pakistani positions Emboldened by the success he pursued the
retreating Pakistani troops and artillery gunning down a Pakistani tank in the
process. However Pakistani forces regrouped and
counterattacked. In the ensuing tank battle ten enemy tanks were hit and
destroyed of which Khetarpal accounted for four.
The
skirmish however took its toll on the Lieutenant as he was hit by enemy fire,
but instead of abandoning the tank he fought on destroying one final tank
before he was finally overwhelmed. However, his actions had denied a vital
breakthrough for Pakistani forces and instead put the Indians in a stronger
position in the Shakargarh bulge. His final words over the radio to a superior
officer who had ordered him to abandon his burning tank were, "No Sir, I
will not abandon my tank. My gun is still working and I will get these
bastards." Then he set about destroying the remaining enemy tanks. The
last enemy tank, which he shot, was barely 100 metres from his position. At
this stage his tank received a second hit and he was mortally injured. The
officer met his death denying the enemy the intended breakthrough. Khetarpal's
tank "Famagusta" was restored and is on display at the Indian Army's
Armoured Corps School in Ahmed Nagar.
For
his conspicuous gallantry in the face of the enemy, Khetarpal was honoured with
the highest wartime gallantry medal, the Param Vir Chakra, posthumously.
Tributes:
1.
Indian Army has produced many brave officers who have laid down their lives in
the line of duty. But the bravery of Khetarpal has indeed been the highest
point in the history of the Army. His bravery is deeply embeded in the ethos of
the Army and is evident from the numerous
buildings named after him at IMA and NDA, higher than any other officer of the
Indian Army.
2.
The IMA has its auditorium named Khetarpal and the all passing out officers
take oath in front of this building.
3.
The IMA also has one of the main entrance gate named Khetarpal.
4.
The main ground at NDA is named Khetarpal Ground.
5.
The tank of Arun Khetarpal was called Famagusta Jx 202. It was restored after
the war and is kept in the Armoured Corps School, Ahmed Nagar.
6.
Famagusta's crew was Sowar Prayag Singh, the driver. Sowar Nand Singh, the
Radio Operator. Sowar Nathu Singh, the Gunner and 2/lt Arun Khetarpal, the
commander.
7.
Nand Singh was first to die. This was just before the fatal encounter with
Major Nasser. Then Arun sccumbed to his injuries. Both Prayag Singh and Nathu
Singh were badly wounded but survived and retired from the army as Hon.
Captains.
8.
Arun Khetarpal's mother did not get the news of his death till the 26th of
December. She had got his motorcycle serviced and his room decked up after
hearing that the war was over on the 17th December.
9.
He was cremated on the 17th of December near Samba dictrict. All his family got
was his ashes in small handkerchief.
10.
Mrs Indira Gandhi met Mrs Khetarpal, Arun's mother, after the war and told him
quote 'Aap Dhanya Hai' with moisture in her eyes.
The enemy remembers:
1.
"The only occasion when a breakthrough could have occurred was when two
squadrons of 13 Lancers attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last
ditch lone stand by 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal of Poona Horse averted the danger."
Maj (Retd) A. H. Amin (Pakistan Armour Corps - Columnist and Historian) .
2.
The Commander of the Pakistan tank battalion is said to have met the Indian
battalion commander after the battle and made inquiries about 2nd Lieutenant
Khetarpal's tank since he was very impressed with the gallantry of this
particular tank's commander.
3.
In 2001, Brigadier M.L. Khetarpal - now 81 years old - felt a strong desire to
visit his birthplace at Sargodha, now in Pakistan. At Lahore airport, Brigadier
M.L. Khetarpal was met by Brigadier Khawja Mohammad Naser, who took it upon
himself to be Brigadier M.L. Khetarpal host and guide. Brigadier Naser really
went out of way to ensure that Brigadier M.L. Khetarpal had a satisfying and
nostalgic visit to his old house in Sargodha. Upon his return to Lahore he was
once again the guest of Brigadier Naser for three days. Brigadier M.L.
Khetarpal was overwhelmed by the extreme kindness, deference, courtesy and
respect bestowed upon him by Brigadier Naser and by all the members of his
family and his many servants. However Brigadier Khetarpal felt that something
was amiss but could not make out what it was. Was it the long silences that
punctuated their animated conversation or was it the look of compassion in the
eyes of the women in the family? He could not make out but was sure he was
being treated as someone very special.
Finally,
on the last night before Brigadier M.L. Khetarpal's departure, Brigadier Naser
said 'Sir, there is something that I wanted to tell you for many years but I
did not know how to get through to you. Finally, fate has intervened and sent
you to me as an honoured guest. The last few days we have become close to one
another and that has made my task even more difficult. It is regarding your son
who is, of course, a national hero in India. However on that fateful day, your
son and I were soldiers, unknown to one another, fighting for the respect and
safety of our respective countries. I regret to tell you that your son died in
my hands. Arun's courage was exemplary and he moved his tank with fearless
courage and daring, totally unconcerned about his safety. Tank casualties were
very high till finally there were just two of us left facing one another. We
both fired simultaneously. It was destined that I was to live and he was to
die.
"It
was only later that I got to know how young he was and who he was. I had all
along thought that I would ask your forgiveness, but in telling the story I
realize that there is nothing to forgive. Instead I salute your son for what he
did at such a young age and I salute you too, because I know how he grew into
such a young man. In the end it is character and values that matter."
Brigadier
M.L. Khetarpal was silent as he did not know how to react. To be enjoying the
hospitality of the person who had killed his son was a confusing feeling.
However being a soldier himself he genuinely admired the chivalry of an officer
whose complete squadron was decimated by his son.
Both
the Brigadiers retired for the night deep in thought. There are never any
victors in war; both sides lose and it is the families that have to pay the
price and suffer the most. As someone once said 'Wars are created by
politicians, compounded by bureaucrats and fought by soldiers.'
The
next day photographs were taken and Brigadier M.L. Khetarpal returned back to
Delhi. Later the photos reached Delhi along with a note from Brigadier Naser
that said:
With
Warmest regards and utmost sincerity,
To: Brigadier
M.L. Khetarpal,
Father
of Shaheed Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, PVC, (who stood like an
unsurmountable rock, between the victory and failure, of the counter attack by
the 'SPEARHEADS' 13 LANCERS on 16 December 1971 in the battle of "Bara
Pind' as we call it and battle of "Basantar' as 17 Poona Horse remembers)
From: Khawja
Mohammad Naser, 13 Lancers, 02 March 2001, Lahore, Pakistan.
·
Do
we still have such parents and such youngsters in this country?
·
Do
we still want to remember their sacrifice?
·
I
don't remember any memorial for him in Pune (except the one in NDA)
·
or
any other part of our country - it has so many for worthless politicians and
their elephants........!

Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Role of Honors
Col. Ashok Chauhan, Vr. C, COAS' CC
Col. Jodh Singh Dhillon, SM**, COAS CC
Col. Mandip Grewal, SM** (Gallantry) GOC-in-C CC
Col. Amarjeet Singh, SM, COAS CC***, GOC-in-C CC
Maj Gen Nawnit Kumar, SM, GOC-in-C WC CC, CISC CC
Capt. Sanjay Anand, SM
Col. Arun Parashar, SM
Brig. Umar Farrook, VSM
Brig Navdeep Mathur, M in D; COAS CC, GOC-in-C (NC) CC, CISC CC, GOC-in-C (SC) CC
Col. Dile Ram Semwal, COAS CC***, Army Cdr (WC) CC
Brig SK Verma. COAS CC**, GOC-in-C West Comd CC
Lt. Col Vishvender Pathak, COAS CC**
Capt. SB Tyagi, COAS CC**
Col. Ram Kishore Mishra, COAS CC, GOC-in-C CC
Col Bharat Bhushan, COAS CC, GOC-in-C NC
Maj Gen Sanjay Soi, COAS CC
Col KJ Siddhu, COAS CC
Col Surchand Singh, COAS CC

Sunday, April 8, 2012
Sad demise of Major Hemant Govind Khare
It is sad duty I am performing for the first time after starting this blog, to inform all the course-mates about the sad and untimely demise of our course mate: Major Hemant Govind Khare.
Major Khare was commissioned in Army Service Corps (ASC) along with six other course-mates and had very charming and pleasant personality. Known for his amiable and cooperative nature and also his background (his father Maj. Gen. Khare), he was rated as officer sure to go higher in his career. But sadly destiny had different plans and he left Army as Major and was settled in Pune.
I am sure all course-mates join me in praying for everlasting peace to departed soul and strength to the family members to bear this irreplaceable loss!
Major Khare was commissioned in Army Service Corps (ASC) along with six other course-mates and had very charming and pleasant personality. Known for his amiable and cooperative nature and also his background (his father Maj. Gen. Khare), he was rated as officer sure to go higher in his career. But sadly destiny had different plans and he left Army as Major and was settled in Pune.
I am sure all course-mates join me in praying for everlasting peace to departed soul and strength to the family members to bear this irreplaceable loss!





Thursday, April 5, 2012
Amarjit

Farook 2

Farook 1

Saxena 2

Saxena

Dinner at Satbir's swanky new home!

Friday, March 30, 2012
Message for Course Reunion from: Col Sadananada S Nayak (Retd), our DS

Dear Capt SB Tyagi,
Thanks for the prompt reply and mailing all the details of the connectivity through to all the old DS'es and the 33 O.T.A. folks,Thanks for the invite at the same time, I MUST express "Our Sincere Best wishes for The Spirit of The Team 33rd OTA in organizing this function and pray that this legacy of 33rd's wonderful efforts to connect may flourish multi-fold and prosper many folds with many unlimited leaps bounds.
Thanks for the prompt reply and mailing all the details of the connectivity through to all the old DS'es and the 33 O.T.A. folks,Thanks for the invite at the same time, I MUST express "Our Sincere Best wishes for The Spirit of The Team 33rd OTA in organizing this function and pray that this legacy of 33rd's wonderful efforts to connect may flourish multi-fold and prosper many folds with many unlimited leaps bounds.
Folks keep the flag of the institution ever high and the name of the Great Army - irrespective of the current scenario's wherein some of our higher echelons of the Army stand exposed to punishment due to their own bad doings in their serving years in the past!
INDIA Will see it and the world will see it too!
But 33rd , please visibly raise in your contribution to bring in high quality professional excellence in the field where you are in right now and become the best. MAY GOD ALMIGHTY Be with you ever in your deeds. Wish you & alll your Family members The Very Best In The Life Ahead Always "
Thanks
Best Regards
Col Sadananada S Nayak (Retd)
Colonel Sadananda S Nayak (Retd)'s Overview
Current Group Head Security & Vigilance at Manipal Health Enterprises Private ltd
Past Chief Security Officer at ELCIA
Chief Security Officer at Infosys Technologies Ltd
Chief Security Officer - Country Head & Principal Staff Training College at Vijaya Bank
Comment by US Gill
SUCH STORY SELLS BUT IT NEVER BUILDS THE NATION
Any thing which is conceivable to divert, to lie, and to suppress, with an aim to make a headline, is the emerging doctrine which is something, I am watching with horror. This perceptible shift in the investigative journalism is certainly alarming. I am more horrified to pick up the reaction of the common people in streets, in offices, private get together or anywhere. The reaction of the people, indicating the calamity of thoughts and which over the time has degenerated to the extent of extreme subservience to faceless, yet powerful lobby of corruption. The captivated audience of this great nation, who also happens to be custodians of the democratic values of our country, is being subjected to orchestration of the kind, which was never seen before in the history of our country. We are witnessing the phenomenal degeneration, and with every roost of lies there is an umbilical chord connected with mothering thoughts, which are sinister and so damaging.
The brain behind the methodical aggression and the pointed urgency, resides in the deep nexus of corrupt beneficiaries. Mutely we are watching the macabre display of arrogance and depleting standards of reporting. The story and the story lines, lack stinging punches of authenticity and this man, the author of the story, gained notoriety and that exactly he wanted to. In the absolute management of corruption, everybody with interest is conniving; they are pulling all the resources under their undue influence, so as to bring in the concocted version, to deceive and to conceal.
Let me say now with truth, that how people are reacting and that includes, my very dear friends. Now, I understand that with their constraining attitude, they prefer very cozy conditions to pass strictures against a man of very high integrity. They have been living in comfort zone for years and with conniving trend, they are unknowingly strengthening the hands of a devil.
Nation building is a serious issue and even if we have to introspect to correct the phenomenal mistake of the past, then we must do on war footing.
I know somewhere, the typewriters under dictating terms, calibrating the mood of masses and just waiting for another story, with succulent description. Such story sells but it never builds the nation.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Passing out Parade in Officers Training Acadamy

Reunion of SS-33 Tech24 on 17th March 12: It was evening with nip in the breezy air and...
It was evening with nip in the breezy air and excitement overwhelming! After thirty years they were to meet! Now they were not as young as they used to be, nor as energetic which such meeting used to make them, yet they were in their best and were prepared to impress those they were to meet after such a long time.
Their affairs started when they were young and impressionable and easily enamored by the charms and attraction of their first date, which they had decided with unashamed celebration and gaiety. This day would be their first day after thirty years’ long-distance affair they continued to maintain so jealously!
The 17th of March 2012 was the date of reunion for SS -33 (NT) / Tech. 24. The charming venue of Officers’ Mess of 5 Signal Group was decked-up with the finest of Signal Regiment’s regalia and decorations. The silvers and trophies in majestic display were in effortless harmony of the interiors of this very impressive Mess! Farook with the lady was gracious host of the evening.
The course-mates, not lesser then 33 came from far-and-wide and in the midst was Brig. Subodh Kaul (12 Bihar), our DS along with Mrs. Kaul. ‘Rummy Tummies’, ‘Beer Bellies’ and ‘Couch Pouches’ were hall marks of some as ‘grey-hairs’ or ‘no-hairs’ were identification marks of few. Ladies in attendance were as charming as their children – all eager to meet and acquaint with each others. Thus “Re-union Cocktail Dinner’ started with a presentation prepared painstakingly by US Gill (Unserviceable Gill). This PP provided glimpses of the OTA life to ladies and children. It also had many rare photos dug out from personal archives of course-mates. Some of them had somber and some had hilarious responses from the gathering.
After initial introduction, group was soon seen slitting in the smaller sub-groups for more intense and intrinsic ‘catching-up. There was lot to exchange and obviously needed all the batteries to be charged-up. Thus waiters were seen always on the trot and tumblers refilled in double times. The snacks were tasty and toasts were raised many times for good health of course-mates, DSs and Hinduja’s you-know-who? It still remained a secret, though seriously all tried to find out as to who did that ill-famous ‘pinching-of-behind’, which saw the course getting the ‘ragada’ which we did not deserve.
Night was still young and alluring that we broke for dinner which was sumptuous and just a look of the dishes whetted appetites. Yet there were few preferring the liquid diet and continued their flirtations with Bacchus! It was only with reluctance that they proceeded for their dinner. Soon after the dinner, few ceremonies were to be performed encouraging the crowd to get the idea that tomorrow shall be another day. There were promises exchanged with the exchange of visiting cards that contacts shall be maintained and there were desires expressed very earnestly that re-unions should be now regular annual affairs as majority of the course-mates have already looked after their careers, children and families and now is the time, some of which can be spent of themselves!
Their affairs started when they were young and impressionable and easily enamored by the charms and attraction of their first date, which they had decided with unashamed celebration and gaiety. This day would be their first day after thirty years’ long-distance affair they continued to maintain so jealously!
The 17th of March 2012 was the date of reunion for SS -33 (NT) / Tech. 24. The charming venue of Officers’ Mess of 5 Signal Group was decked-up with the finest of Signal Regiment’s regalia and decorations. The silvers and trophies in majestic display were in effortless harmony of the interiors of this very impressive Mess! Farook with the lady was gracious host of the evening.
The course-mates, not lesser then 33 came from far-and-wide and in the midst was Brig. Subodh Kaul (12 Bihar), our DS along with Mrs. Kaul. ‘Rummy Tummies’, ‘Beer Bellies’ and ‘Couch Pouches’ were hall marks of some as ‘grey-hairs’ or ‘no-hairs’ were identification marks of few. Ladies in attendance were as charming as their children – all eager to meet and acquaint with each others. Thus “Re-union Cocktail Dinner’ started with a presentation prepared painstakingly by US Gill (Unserviceable Gill). This PP provided glimpses of the OTA life to ladies and children. It also had many rare photos dug out from personal archives of course-mates. Some of them had somber and some had hilarious responses from the gathering.
After initial introduction, group was soon seen slitting in the smaller sub-groups for more intense and intrinsic ‘catching-up. There was lot to exchange and obviously needed all the batteries to be charged-up. Thus waiters were seen always on the trot and tumblers refilled in double times. The snacks were tasty and toasts were raised many times for good health of course-mates, DSs and Hinduja’s you-know-who? It still remained a secret, though seriously all tried to find out as to who did that ill-famous ‘pinching-of-behind’, which saw the course getting the ‘ragada’ which we did not deserve.
Night was still young and alluring that we broke for dinner which was sumptuous and just a look of the dishes whetted appetites. Yet there were few preferring the liquid diet and continued their flirtations with Bacchus! It was only with reluctance that they proceeded for their dinner. Soon after the dinner, few ceremonies were to be performed encouraging the crowd to get the idea that tomorrow shall be another day. There were promises exchanged with the exchange of visiting cards that contacts shall be maintained and there were desires expressed very earnestly that re-unions should be now regular annual affairs as majority of the course-mates have already looked after their careers, children and families and now is the time, some of which can be spent of themselves!

Thursday, January 26, 2012
Hitting the General below the belt
Before Army chief General Vijay Kumar Singh’s doughty daughter landed up at the Supreme registry to file a writ petition on behalf of her father on Monday evening, the officer wrote to Defence Minister A K Antony that he was taking legal recourse in the age issue. General Singh informed Antony that he had been forced to go to the court to prevent a possible adverse legal fallout of another petition filed before by the Rohtak chapter of the so-called Grenadiers Association and with which he had no truck in any way. It is another matter that a court insider leaked the news of General Singh going to court to TV news channels much before his letter reached Antony on Monday.
General Singh was advised by his lawyers that his legal options on the date of birth issue would be closed if the Supreme Court took up the Grenadiers Association’s petition as it was rather insidious and factually inaccurate in many places. For instance, the association’s petition stated that Lt. General Bikramjeet Singh, presently Eastern Army Commander and in line for the Army Chief’s job, was related to Prime Manmohan Singh.Given such inaccuracies, the Supreme Court in all probability would have taken a rather poor view of the submission and would have foreclosed all options for General Singh.
Now that General Singh has sought legal remedy to determine whether he was born in 1950 or 1951, it would be interesting to shed light on the behind the scenes and unsuccessful dialogue between him and the government over what the he terms as an honour and integrity issue. General Singh in his petition has sought interim relief from the court over the rejection of his statutory complaint on the age issue by the Defence Minister on December 30, 2011. After General Singh filed his statutory complaint before Antony on August 25, 2011, he met UPA wise man and Finance Minister Pranab and told him what he had done.Mukherjee looked at General Singh and said that he took this statutory complaint as an opportunity and not a challenge for the government. General Singh told Mukherjee that the complaint was only aimed at rectifying his age and not programmed to increase his tenure as Army Chief - a matter which is the prerogative of the government.
For the next four months, a key government interlocutor and a close friend of Singh played the messenger in the hope that an amicable compromise could be reached. The interlocutor failed. Not because his or General Singh’s intentions were not honourable but because the UPA has now acquired the habit of speaking in multiple voices.The final straw for the Chief was a series of slanderous media articles this month which led him to believe that they were being orchestrated by the Defence Ministry. Before General Singh went on an official visit to Myanmar on January 5 he met National Security Advisor Shiv Shanker Menon. Sharp as he is, Menon suggested that the government would come out with a statement making it amply clear that age was not the issue and that it wanted General Singh for other services preferably in the civilian set-up. As the idea was fair, General Singh agreed to it with a single caveat. He said as long as the government agreed that his date of birth was 1951 he was even willing to resign and pave way for whomsoever the UPA wanted to appoint as Army Chief. General Singh returned from Myanmar on January 9 and met Mukherjee, who assured him that he was on the job and solution soon would be found to the age issue.In the meantime, senior UPA ministers including Antony, P Chidambaram and Salman Khurshid prepared for stage two by calling General Singh a very competent soldier. A solution was in sight and the interlocutor was toiling hard, but then came the series of slanted media articles, which the Army suspects the Defence Ministry of inspiring and that hit at General Singh’s personal integrity. A day before the Army Day on January 15, Antony gave a dressing down to all his officers and made it clear that not a word should be leaked by his ministry. But the damage had been done.
General Singh was awarded the Yudh Seva Medal in 1989-90, the Ati Vasisht Seva Medal in 2006 and the Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 2009 by the President of India with his date of birth May 10, 1951 mentioned on them, but still the inspired media articles took pot shots at him. After hosting At-Home for the President, the Prime Minister and Congress president Sonia Gandhi, General Singh decided to take on his detractors. The writ petition was drafted by 3.00 am on Monday morning and submitted before the Court on the same day.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012
Date of Birth of Gen. VK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC

AGE CONTROVERSY - SOME MYTHS AND HARD FACTS
1. Ancestral Village: BAPORA in Bhiwani Distt (Haryana)
2. Father: Late Lt. Col Jagat of Rajput Regiment (14 RAJPUT)
3.Date & Place of Birth: 10 May 1951 at MH, Pune
(Fathers record of service and 14 RAJPUT records refer).
4. Schooling: Birla Public School, Pilani (Rajasthan) up to Class X - MARCH 1966
5. Date of Birth Recorded in School Register and School Leaving Certificate - 10 May, 1951
6. Applied for written entrance exam for National Defence Academy (NDA) Khardakwasla as Air Force Entry Cadet for 36 NDA Course commencing 13 July 1966.
1966 MARCH:
DOB wrongly filled in the UPSC entrance form by BS Bhatnagar, erstwhile English teacher at Birla Public School, Pilani as 10 May 1950 instead of 10 May 1951.
Eligible age for entry for 36 NDA course as on 01July1966: 15 Years to 17-1/2 years - Gen. VK Singh eligible for both the ages i.e. 10 May 1951 and 10 May 1950
Matriculation Certificate or Certificate of Date of Birth from his father not attached with the application form pending receipt from Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan/Lt. Col. Jagat Singh (Father). At the time of filling the UPSC application form, Gen. VK Singh was MINOR (14 years Plus) and had possibly signed the form without checking the details with the confidence that all details filled by his teacher would be correct.
Before facing Service Selection Board and entry to NDA, a Certificate from his Fathers Unit (14 RAJPUT) and School Leaving Certificate giving correct Date of Birth (i.e. 10 May 1951) was forwarded to UPSC/appropriate authorities
03 AUG 1966
UPSC, then, queried the Officer as to the anomaly between DOB filled in the UPSC application form and the two certificates subsequently forwarded as at serial 9 above. The query was replied to with confirmation that correct Date of Birth is 10 May 1951, as recorded in School Leaving Certificate and his Fathers service records maintained by his unit (14 RAJPUT). Receipt for above correspondence with UPSC available. Based on the facts mentioned at Serial 10 above and having convinced itself on the correct DOB (10 May 1051) the Officer was given a call for Service Selection Board (SSB) and allowed to join NDA as PROVISIONAL candidate pending receipt/submission of MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE. The UPSC, thereafter, never queried on the issue of DOB confirming that issue has been laid to rest. The Matric Certificate was not submitted at this time since though the results were declared on 13 June 1966, but the Certificate was not issued. However, school had issued Provisional School Leaving Certificate, which mentioned his passing Xth class and DOB as 10 May 1951. The Certificate was accordingly forwarded to appropriate authorities.
The Officer filed a Record of Service particulars form while joining NDA which reflects his DOB as 10 May 1951.His Medical Examination form as an Air Force Candidate reflects 10 May 1951 as his DOB.
The Officer joined Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun after passing out from NDA and was commissioned in Indian Army on 14 June 1970 in Infantry (2 RAJPUT).
14 June 1970
All records maintained by NDA/IMA reflected DOB as 10 May 1951. Based on Service Records maintained at IMA, it issued officer Identity Card to 2Lt VK Singh reflecting this Date of Birth as 10 May 1951 (based on School Leaving Certificate) since Matric Certificate was not submitted by then.(This endorsement could not have been made if IMA records did not hold 10 May 1951 in the officers records of service particulars maintained by them. The officer on commissioning joined 2 RAJPUT on 1970 and filled form No IAFZ-2041 on joining the Unit, which is forwarded to Army HQ AGs Branch (the official Record Holders of all Officers). Even IMA forwarded IAFZ-2041 to AG Branch (10 May 51)
14 June 1970
Here, once again, at Para/Serial 6 of the Form the Officer filled his DOB as 10 MAY 1951.
The Officer attends Infantry Young Officers Course(YO-COURCE-2) at Mhow and returns to the Unit (2 RAJPUT) on April 1971.
Sep 1970 to March 1971
Before reporting back to his Unit, he visits his village and finds the Matric Certificate there. The Matric Certificate was issued by Rajasthan Secondary Board of Education on 13 June 1966 and forwarded to Birla Public School.
Birla Public School forwarded the Matric Certificate at his fathers Unit address (14 RAJPUT). But his father had been posted out of the Unit by then to Branch Recruiting office REWA & thereafter to NCC Narnaul. 14 RAJPUT had accordingly dispatched the certificate to Rewa Rectg Office, who then dispatched it to NCC Narnaul, who further forwarded it to the Officer's ancestral village where his father had moved on retirement. Obviously the Matric Certificate kept lying at his village unattended since no one was residing at his ancestral house since his father had moved out to Bhiwani where he expired. The officer instantly submitted the Original matriculation certificate late to Army HQ (AGs Branch) through his Unit (4 RAJPUT).
April 1971
The Unit had sent the certificate to Army HQ (AGs Branch) who after due verification and updating their records returned the original certificate to the Officer and changed Provisional status to Permanent. Meanwhile, without checking and confirming detailed record of service from Army HQ (AGs Branch) who are the Official record holder and authority on all such matters) Military Secretary Branch (MS) got ARMY LIST reflecting wrong Date of Birth of the Officer as 10 MAY 1950, instead of 1951. Though the Orders on the subject are very clear on the subject, MS Branch failed to verify the Date of Birth of the Officer from official record holder (AGs Branch) and the CGDA (the paying authority) and erroneously and carelessly endorsed 10 May 1950 as the officers DOB in the Army List.
Even when Matric Certificate was received by AGs Branch at Army HQ in April 1971 (within two years of Commissioning of the officer, no effort was made by MS Branch to either correct its records nor verify the same from AGs Branch annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971.
The seeds of main controversy of DOB of Gen VK Singh were sown by the careless attitude and erroneous actions by the MS Branch at this stage which was allowed to persist till 2006 when they first queried the officer on the anomaly in his DOB. (30 years after commissioning -?)
Why at this belated stage- ??
The mistake was even never rectified till date by the MS Branch even when they were in receipt of the Record of Service annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971. The officer is required to endorse Form checklist on completion of 20 years of service; the Forms asks have you ever asked for a change in DOB, if so what is your correct DOB?. To which the officer on 30 Nov 1990 reflected NO, my correct DOB is 10.
MAY 1951.
Even then no cognizance of this report was taken to correct records by MS Branch, the FIRST ever query on the anomaly on the officers DOB as reflected by him in his Annual Record of Service as 10 May 1951 and in Army List as 10 May 1950, was made by, then, Military Secretary on 3rd May 2006.
3rd May 2006
The officer has clearly replied that his correct DOB as endorsed in the AGs Branch records and all other service records is 10 May 1951,which is maintained till date. The officer was issued with a certificate by AG MP (5&6) on 17 Oct,2007 that his correct DOB as recorded with them was 10 May 1951.
17 Oct 2007
(The letter signed by AAG of concerned Branch refers)Once again, Additional General (Manpower Planning and Personnel (MP&P) reflected entire details on record of service of the officer confirming DOB at each stage as 10 MAY 1951. The ADG in his letter has concluded that all recorded endorsements in the documents stated above the DOB of Gen VK Singh is 10 MAY 1951.
January 2008
The letter clearly states that Record of Service (IAFZ-2041) of every officer on commissioning is forwarded by IMA/OTA to AG Branch (MP-5/6) at Army HQ. It includes all occurrences during office service. Part-I (Personal Particulars) of this documents is filled-up by IMA/OTA to the extent applicable at the time of commissioning. Para 5 of Part-I states Date of Birth (as recorded by UPSC or in Sheet Roll). Interestingly Date of Birth recorded in this Para 5 of Part I is 10 MAY 1951. Even DOB recorded in all Annual and other Medical Examination Boards is 10 MAY 1951. Once again DG (MP&PS) at Army HQ Lt. Gen. KR Rao in his Inter Office Note dt 30 Jan 2008 in reply to MS Branch service note dt 28 Jan 2008 mentions correct DOB of the Officer as 10 MAY 1951.
30 Jan 2008
Even then MS Branch failed to correct/reconcile its erroneous records of DOB. As per Para 136 of Defence Services Regulations (DSR), DOB recorded in Matric certificate is to be taken as correct DOB and the aberration if any in the Record of Service are to be corrected by the concerned record holding authority. In the instant case the MS Branch failed to rectify their records. The officer replied to MS Branch query of 3rd May 2006 as at ser 24 above on
10th May 2006
Officer clarified that:-
- SSC certificate is the authority of his DOB (10 MAY 1951)
- Had forwarded the SSC certificate to Org 3 (AGs Branch)
- Consequently his Provisional status of Commission was changed to Permanent
- Made efforts in 1985 to correct the Record of DOB in the Army List to MP-5 and was informed that needful would be done.
- Had made another effort in 2002 with MS Branch by sending a photocopy of Matric Certificate to MISO. However, no correction was made in the said DOB erroneously recorded at their end.
- MS Branch, vide their letter of 21 Aug 2006 replied that no change in the DOB is possible as the Rules only permit to do so with in first two years of Service.
21 Aug 2006
MS Branch grossly erred here and misinterpreted the Reconciliation DOB in their Records to Change in DOB. The whole controversy emanates from this misinterpretation of the Rules on the subject and has been allowed to willy nilly or otherwise continue till dates.
October 2007
Even when AGs Branch in October 2007 had clarified and confirmed to MS Branch on the correct DOB and 10 MAY 1951, no action was taken by the latter to rectify the mistake committed by them earlier. In Dec 2007 Min. of Defence asked MS Branch to indicate reasons of recording 10 MAY 1950 as been VK Singhs DOB when he had himself indicated 10 MAY 1951 in his Annual Confidential Records.
14 Dec 2007
MOD queries MS Branch for reasons of recording DOB as 10 May 1950 and asks for conduct of inquiry. MS Branch replied that they had relied upon UPSC application form in which the officer had filled 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB. They also claimed to rely on Army List which they had themselves endorsed with 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB without checking from AGs Branch (Official Record Holder)
20 Dec 2007
The MS Branch once again quoted GOI Office memorandum 21 April 1964 and MoD Memorandum 23 June 1954, under which no change in DOB is to be made after 2 years of commissioning of the officers. Again misinterpretation of Orders since officer was not asking for CHANGE but RECTIFICATION of mistakes committed by them. Once again MS Branch asked officer to send all correspondence relating to his earlier requests for CHANGE of his DOB.
19 Dec 2007
The officer once again replied that he had never asked for a CHANGE in DOB, but CORRECTION of erroneous records at their end based on Matric Certificate submitted to AGs Branch and other related documents/reports (ACRs). Again AG Branch verified that Record of Service received by them from IMA at the time of Commissioning of the officer his DOB recorded is 10 MAY 1951.
Dec 2007
Subsequently on 21 Jan 2008, MS Branch sticking to its previous stand, replied that the DOB mentioned in Army List (10 May 1950) will remain to be correct and no change will be affected. 21 Jan 2008. Once again the Rule of 2 years restriction in change of DOB was quoted continuous case of misinterpretation of the issue at hand and Rules on the subject.
The Officer was pressurized by Gen Deepak Kapoor, the then COAS, to admit 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB and accept it in the interest of Service and other officers whose promotion case files are pending in the Min. of Defence for clearance Through telephonic conversation with COAS he was also assured that once the needful is done the fresh case for correcting his DOB could be effected later.
The Officer accordingly gave this undertaking especially highlighting the same in the Interest of Service, hoping for due justice as the matter would be settled as promised.
24 Jan 2008
MS Branch later in their letter dt 28 Jan 2008 made reference of the officer letter saying doubts on the DOB still remain unanswered. It also referred MOD request to carry out detailed inquiry to find out correct DOB in consultation with AGs Branch. HOWEVER, NO INQUIRY WAS CONDUCTED AND NOTING ON THE CASE WAS FOUND SAYING, INQUIRY NOT TO BE CONDUCTED.
Subsequently the Officer in his letter dt 01 July 2008 addressed to COAS, Gen. Deepak Kapoor requesting for Justice to be done in his case and enquired into the constraints by MS Branch which compelled them to maintain his DOB as 10 MAY 1950 despite submitting SSC Certificate in 1974 which recorded 10 MAY 1951 as his DOB.
01 July 2008
It was mentioned in the officers letter that when he met Lt.Gen. Khare and Gen. Gangadharan of the MS Brnach in 2006 and 2007 respectively, he was assured that all necessary reconciliations with regard to the clarification his DOB would be carried out. The officer then issued a letter dt Feb 2009 to MS Branch in response to their letter dt. 15 Jan 2009 to him which had quoted in their letter that verification process of DOB by MS Branch did not require Matriculation Certificate, while the same is an accepted authority for the same.
03 June 2009
The officer pointed out that whereas Matric Certificate was an authority, then what is the procedure for MS Branch to verify the DOB? MS Branch asserted that it was not responsible to verify the age (DOB) as it was the duty of AG Branch. Why did MS Branch not reconcile the facts?
15 Jan 2009
On 25th May 2011 AGs Branch, once again, certified the DOB of the officer as 10 MAY 1951.
25 May 11
- RTI dt. 25 Oct 2010 filed by Dr. Kamal Tiwari in MOD for obtaining information on the subject.
14 Feb 2011
- Min. of Law opined &' confirmed DOB as 10 MAY 1951 (on 14 Feb 2011).
- Min. of Def vide their letter dt. 8 May 2011 informed the RTI querist that DOB of the officer in High School Certificate and Records of AG Branch at Army HQ was same (10 MAY 1951)
25 May 11
- RTI dt. 25 Oct 2010 filed by Dr. Kamal Tiwari in MOD for obtaining information on the subject.
14 Feb 2011
- Min. of Law opined &' confirmed DOB as 10 MAY 1951 (on 14 Feb 2011).
- Min. of Def vide their letter dt. 8 May 2011 informed the RTI querist that DOB of the officer in High School Certificate and Records of AG Branch at Army HQ was same (10 MAY 1951)
08 May 2011
In the same reply Law Ministry informed that there was Omission in Core Branch (MS Branch) and the Ministry of Law & Justice had advised for the necessary corrections.
But, surprisingly the matter was once again referred to Attorney General of India and the Law Ministry. The News Media has since reported that now Attorney General and Law & Justice Minister have reversed their earlier opinion saying that now the DOB of Gen. VK Singh is 10 MAY 1950. The entire case smacks of a deeper plot to malign the image of Chief of Indian Army. In spite of solid and legal proof of his DOB, the persons behind the scene are not permitting the corrections be made in his DOB that MS Branch had no system for verification of the DOB. He also intimated that he had given acceptance to the DOB (!0 MAY 1950) in good faith at the behest of COAS and not in agreement with the conclusion of the said MS Branch. Surprisingly MS Branch responded vide their letter dt 03 June 2009 that THEY WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFICATION OF DOB AS THE SAME WAS CHARTERED AS THE DUTIES OF AGs BRANCH
May be it is an indirect effort to malign the Government to tarnish the image of this fine institution INDIAN ARMY. Ramifications of not taking the issue to rightful conclusion based on justified action are grave, especially when our enemies are eagerly waiting to dismantle and demoralize our Armed Forces.
The Print Media and Electronic Media, so far, have reflected the issue in bits and pieces without giving the complete picture, which has left the masses in doubt so serious that some of them have even raised eyebrows on the personal integrity of the Army Chief. Immediate efforts towards clearing all such misunderstandings and doubts and to let the people judge the case on the merits of the case and to know from the facts enumerated above that there are some vested powers, who are hell bent to destroy the image of our Army Chief and promote some gullible and pliable personalities for the post, are required.
Important to Note:-
But, surprisingly the matter was once again referred to Attorney General of India and the Law Ministry. The News Media has since reported that now Attorney General and Law & Justice Minister have reversed their earlier opinion saying that now the DOB of Gen. VK Singh is 10 MAY 1950. The entire case smacks of a deeper plot to malign the image of Chief of Indian Army. In spite of solid and legal proof of his DOB, the persons behind the scene are not permitting the corrections be made in his DOB that MS Branch had no system for verification of the DOB. He also intimated that he had given acceptance to the DOB (!0 MAY 1950) in good faith at the behest of COAS and not in agreement with the conclusion of the said MS Branch. Surprisingly MS Branch responded vide their letter dt 03 June 2009 that THEY WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFICATION OF DOB AS THE SAME WAS CHARTERED AS THE DUTIES OF AGs BRANCH
May be it is an indirect effort to malign the Government to tarnish the image of this fine institution INDIAN ARMY. Ramifications of not taking the issue to rightful conclusion based on justified action are grave, especially when our enemies are eagerly waiting to dismantle and demoralize our Armed Forces.
The Print Media and Electronic Media, so far, have reflected the issue in bits and pieces without giving the complete picture, which has left the masses in doubt so serious that some of them have even raised eyebrows on the personal integrity of the Army Chief. Immediate efforts towards clearing all such misunderstandings and doubts and to let the people judge the case on the merits of the case and to know from the facts enumerated above that there are some vested powers, who are hell bent to destroy the image of our Army Chief and promote some gullible and pliable personalities for the post, are required.
Important to Note:-
The aberration in DOB was first racked- up when Gen. J.J. Singh was COAS (2006). Interestingly planning for TWO DOWN COAS commences when a Maj. Gen. is approved for Lt. Gen. (So called LINE OF SUCCESSION after Gen. V.K. Singh drawn then, and has since been talked about and quoted today officially.
General Deepak Kapoor, the previous COAS followed the line for vested interests and vigorously pursued the issue at each stage and made all-out efforts to malign and belittle Gen. V.K. Singh before his being considered as COAS, and now when so called LINE OF SUCCESSION is being firmed-in, the matter has hit the headlines.
Lt. Gen. Avdhesh Prakash, the then, Military Secretary vehemently pursued the agenda of his Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor.
General Deepak Kapoor, the previous COAS followed the line for vested interests and vigorously pursued the issue at each stage and made all-out efforts to malign and belittle Gen. V.K. Singh before his being considered as COAS, and now when so called LINE OF SUCCESSION is being firmed-in, the matter has hit the headlines.
Lt. Gen. Avdhesh Prakash, the then, Military Secretary vehemently pursued the agenda of his Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor.
Hard facts can’t be overlooked...
The obstinate mule headed approach, red tape of MS branch who deal with careers & promotions & the bureaucrats who run the country is obvious.
If a CVC etc. can approach the courts for legal redress, why cannot a Service Chief? He is also a citizen of India, like anybody else and must fight the bureaucracy (read autocracy) till last-man-last-round. We have all borne the brunt of bureaucracy/MS Branch at some time in our careers.
Such systematic disease can only be cured by clean surgical procedure.
If a CVC etc. can approach the courts for legal redress, why cannot a Service Chief? He is also a citizen of India, like anybody else and must fight the bureaucracy (read autocracy) till last-man-last-round. We have all borne the brunt of bureaucracy/MS Branch at some time in our careers.
Such systematic disease can only be cured by clean surgical procedure.

All the Chief's Men: Quotas rule promotions in a “Mandalised” Army
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 14th Jan 12
A recent letter, boldly written by a serving lieutenant colonel to the army chief, General V K Singh says: “PROFESSIONAL DISCRIMINATION is upgrading (sic) into SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION. The formidable INDIAN ARMY is developing cracks. What the enemy would have loved to foster, is happening on its own.”
Says a senior officer of the mechanised forces who was recently promoted, but sees equally competent compatriots being overtaken by lesser officers: “The Indian army has been effectively Mandalised. The traditional meritocracy of senior rank has given way to a shoddy system of quotas that is placing unconfident and incompetent officers to command troops in battle.”
* * *
People sometimes wonder what drives soldiers in the face of death. The answer, surprisingly, is not patriotism, religion, discipline, bloodlust, or a quest for glory. Instead, most soldiers affirm that a shared brotherhood with their comrades is what drives them through mortal danger. The ones who die do so in the belief that death is better than besmirching the legacy of their unit or sub-unit.
“Soldiers live and die for the name of their unit alone,” says Brigadier Virendar Singh who led the assault on the 21,000-feet-high Bana Post above the Siachen Glacier in 1987, one of India’s most stirring military exploits.
Reflecting this philosophy, combat units are structured around the regimental system. Combat arms, which include the infantry (foot soldiers) and the armoured corps (tank men), are all organised into regiments or groups. These include legends like the Gurkha regiment, the Sikh Light Infantry and the Brigade of Guards. The armoured corps has a plethora of famous regiments like 4 Horse, Skinner’s Horse, and 3rd Cavalry.
Officers and jawans go straight from initial training into their unit, a tightly-bonded fraternity of 550 to 800 men. For the duration of their field service, they serve with that same unit, imbibing its ethos and character. Their uniform bears its distinctive symbols — cap badges, shoulder titles, belts, flashes and lanyards — which reaffirm their identity. They soak in, and revel in, their unit’s history, its battle honours and the personalities that it produced.
But the iron framework of the regimental system has now morphed into a monster that is ripping apart the fabric of the army as a whole. The legitimate aim of the regimental system — galvanising esprit de corps in combat units — has been short-sightedly extended into the competition for promotions and postings. Over the preceding decade, a string of army chiefs from two arms — the infantry and the artillery — have fiddled with promotion policies to boost the career prospects of officers from their arms. But every winner also creates a loser in the zero-sum contest to fill a very limited number of promotion vacancies. The losers in this divisive move are the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry, arms that have traditionally produced a high share of the army’s generals. Also on the losing side are combat support arms like the engineers and signals and the logistical services that sustain the combat soldiers.
The tool that has unfairly boosted the prospects of infantry and artillery officers is referred to within the army as “pro-rata” — a Mandal-Commission-style directive that guarantees each arm a fixed number of promotion vacancies, regardless of merit. Pro-rata began in 2002 under an artillery chief, General S Padmanabhan, and was consolidated by his successors: General N C Vij (infantry), General J J Singh (infantry) and General Deepak Kapoor (artillery). In 2009, when General Kapoor was the army chief, this institutionally-debilitating move was translated into formal policy.
Pro-rata rejects the widely accepted belief that senior rank must be awarded on merit, not on quota. Senior officers hold on to their regimental links, which get translated at senior rank into patrimonial ties.
Consider the appointments made by the current army chief, General Singh, from his Rajput Regiment. While Singh has been a relatively fair chief, he has posted officers from the regiment to practically every crucial appointment: the deputy chief of army staff, the director general of military operations, the adjutant general (responsible for discipline and manpower planning), the military secretary who posts and promotes officers, and the additional director general of administration & coordination. In addition, Rajput officers were placed at the head of key formations around Delhi: the Delhi Area which controls military installations around the capital, and the Meerut-based 22 Infantry Division.
* * *
Institutionalising the pro-rata system is letter number 08176/Est/POLICY/MP-2 issued by the adjutant general’s branch (Business Standard has a copy). It effectively allocates to each arm a fixed number of vacancies at the rank of colonel, which is the first selection-grade rank in the army when officers command their battalions/regiments, the basic combat unit with 550 to 800 soldiers. The colonel’s vacancies for each arm are calculated by simply adding up the number of units in that arm. For example, the army has about 350 infantry battalions and 60 armoured regiments.
That is where the Machiavellian fiddle starts. Added to the infantry kitty are some 110 units of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Assam Rifles (AR) located in counter-insurgency areas and manned by officers from every arm. Though an internal army study has found that non-infantry officers perform as gallantly as infantry officers in RR/AR, exclusionary conditions were fram-ed to make it almost impossible for armoured corps or mechanised infantry officers to command these units. With this one step, the infantry’s colonel vacancies went up from 350 to 460, a jump of almost 30 per cent.
But that was just the start; this advantage was then multiplied by differentiating command tenures for each arm. The shorter the command tenure, the more quickly the vacancies would arise, and the larger the number of colonels that would be needed from that arm. The infantry, unsurprisingly, got the shortest command tenure of just two-and-a-half years. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that with 460 colonels needed every two-and-a-half years, the infantry must promote some 184 colonels every year.
The influence of two artillery chiefs boosted the number of artillery units. Small units called “light batteries” with less than 300 soldiers, that were always commanded by lieutenant colonels, were elevated to “light regiments” commanded by colonels. The artillery’s command tenure was shortened from three-and-a-half to three years, similarly boosting its colonel vacancies. And departing radically from established military tradition, in which there are just two combat arms — the armoured corps and the infantry — the artillery was effectively promoted from a “combat support arm” to a combat arm. “How can the artillery be designated as a combat arm? They lob shells from tens of kilometres away and rarely encounter the enemy. Of the combat support arms, the engineers have a much better case for being called a combat arm,” says a retired infantry general who prefers to remain unnamed.
The engineers and the signals, the other two combat support arms, were sharply pegged back with their command tenures fixed at four years — a 33 per cent disadvantage to the artillery. The logistics services were discriminated against even more radically, with command tenures fixed at five years. “We would not go to war as Arms/Supporting arms… but as Indian army. ‘The command based model’ expect us (sic) to be fragmented in peace and united in war,” says the lieutenant colonel’s letter to General Singh.
The quotas of colonel vacancies are merely the tip of the iceberg. Beyond this first level of “Mandalisation” are quotas for brigadier rank, which are proportional to the benchmark that was created with colonel vacancies. Another set of quotas has been created in key career courses like the higher command course (for colonels) and the year-long National Defence College course (for brigadiers), both of which are almost mandatory for promotion. An armoured corps or mechanised infantry brigadier, for example, would be lucky to become a major general without doing the NDC course. By restricting the armoured corps and mechanised infantry vacancies in each NDC course to just two each, an annual quota of promotion to major general is effectively applied.
An armoured corps major general explains how this works: “I was subjected four times to quotas. One, while being promoted to colonel; two, for nomination to the higher command course; three, when I was promoted to brigadier; and four, when I was nominated to the NDC.” Says a young infantry lieutenant colonel: “Promotion prospects are 50 per cent higher in the infantry; so why should anyone join the mechanised infantry?”
* * *
“It will all work out even in the long run,” says a senior infantry officer. “Less qualified officers from the infantry and artillery are benefiting today, but it could be the armoured corps that benefits tomorrow.” This glosses over the basic truth: quotas benefit only the incompetent, whether from one arm or another.
Pro-rata proponents admit that meritocracy is desirable but is, in fact, impossible. They suggest that armoured corps and mechanised infantry officers serve in their own environment where patronage networks operate and even average officers are graded outstanding, tilting the promotion playing field in their favour. This argument overlooks the fact that infantry officers, operating in their own environment, similarly have fellow infantrymen all the way up the reporting chains.
General Singh denies there’s any problem. “Pro-rata is a myth created by people who don’t understand the system. A bandwidth (of merit) has been laid down, and all those who are meritorious are taken care of (i.e. promoted). Show me a man who was meritorious, but was not promoted.”
But the defence ministry does not share his sanguinity. So concerned is it at the army’s promotion methodology that it has held up for months the promotion of a set of major generals, while the army answers questions about various anomalies. The result: there is currently no lieutenant general to command the frontline 9 Corps on the Pakistan border, and there’s nobody to relieve the commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lt Gen Ata Hasnain, who has completed his tenure. In contrast to these promotion delays, navy and air force promotion boards, which adhere to fair and well-documented rules, are normally cleared by the ministry within 15 to 20 days.
General Singh blames the current delay on “letters, comments and private confabulations” between lobbyists and the ministry. “Our boards couldn’t have been fairer. There was transparency and absolute fairness.”
Old soldiers are surprised that the infantry and artillery chiefs could implement pro-rata without a consensus within the army. When the matter was discussed in an army commanders’ conference, the army’s highest forum, a respected mechanised infantry officer, Lt Gen H S Panag, thumped the table and asked whether the next step would be to appoint the army chief through quotas!
There is a growing belief across sections of the army, reflected in the lieutenant colonel’s recent letter, that the cohesiveness of the officer corps hangs in the balance. Mid-ranking officers suggest that realistic feedback be sought from the entire spectrum of officers through a direct medium like the army intranet. But the degree of resentment is perhaps not understood in the ivory towers from where the army is run.
Business Standard, 14th Jan 12
A recent letter, boldly written by a serving lieutenant colonel to the army chief, General V K Singh says: “PROFESSIONAL DISCRIMINATION is upgrading (sic) into SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION. The formidable INDIAN ARMY is developing cracks. What the enemy would have loved to foster, is happening on its own.”
Says a senior officer of the mechanised forces who was recently promoted, but sees equally competent compatriots being overtaken by lesser officers: “The Indian army has been effectively Mandalised. The traditional meritocracy of senior rank has given way to a shoddy system of quotas that is placing unconfident and incompetent officers to command troops in battle.”
* * *
People sometimes wonder what drives soldiers in the face of death. The answer, surprisingly, is not patriotism, religion, discipline, bloodlust, or a quest for glory. Instead, most soldiers affirm that a shared brotherhood with their comrades is what drives them through mortal danger. The ones who die do so in the belief that death is better than besmirching the legacy of their unit or sub-unit.
“Soldiers live and die for the name of their unit alone,” says Brigadier Virendar Singh who led the assault on the 21,000-feet-high Bana Post above the Siachen Glacier in 1987, one of India’s most stirring military exploits.
Reflecting this philosophy, combat units are structured around the regimental system. Combat arms, which include the infantry (foot soldiers) and the armoured corps (tank men), are all organised into regiments or groups. These include legends like the Gurkha regiment, the Sikh Light Infantry and the Brigade of Guards. The armoured corps has a plethora of famous regiments like 4 Horse, Skinner’s Horse, and 3rd Cavalry.
Officers and jawans go straight from initial training into their unit, a tightly-bonded fraternity of 550 to 800 men. For the duration of their field service, they serve with that same unit, imbibing its ethos and character. Their uniform bears its distinctive symbols — cap badges, shoulder titles, belts, flashes and lanyards — which reaffirm their identity. They soak in, and revel in, their unit’s history, its battle honours and the personalities that it produced.
But the iron framework of the regimental system has now morphed into a monster that is ripping apart the fabric of the army as a whole. The legitimate aim of the regimental system — galvanising esprit de corps in combat units — has been short-sightedly extended into the competition for promotions and postings. Over the preceding decade, a string of army chiefs from two arms — the infantry and the artillery — have fiddled with promotion policies to boost the career prospects of officers from their arms. But every winner also creates a loser in the zero-sum contest to fill a very limited number of promotion vacancies. The losers in this divisive move are the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry, arms that have traditionally produced a high share of the army’s generals. Also on the losing side are combat support arms like the engineers and signals and the logistical services that sustain the combat soldiers.
The tool that has unfairly boosted the prospects of infantry and artillery officers is referred to within the army as “pro-rata” — a Mandal-Commission-style directive that guarantees each arm a fixed number of promotion vacancies, regardless of merit. Pro-rata began in 2002 under an artillery chief, General S Padmanabhan, and was consolidated by his successors: General N C Vij (infantry), General J J Singh (infantry) and General Deepak Kapoor (artillery). In 2009, when General Kapoor was the army chief, this institutionally-debilitating move was translated into formal policy.
Pro-rata rejects the widely accepted belief that senior rank must be awarded on merit, not on quota. Senior officers hold on to their regimental links, which get translated at senior rank into patrimonial ties.
Consider the appointments made by the current army chief, General Singh, from his Rajput Regiment. While Singh has been a relatively fair chief, he has posted officers from the regiment to practically every crucial appointment: the deputy chief of army staff, the director general of military operations, the adjutant general (responsible for discipline and manpower planning), the military secretary who posts and promotes officers, and the additional director general of administration & coordination. In addition, Rajput officers were placed at the head of key formations around Delhi: the Delhi Area which controls military installations around the capital, and the Meerut-based 22 Infantry Division.
* * *
Institutionalising the pro-rata system is letter number 08176/Est/POLICY/MP-2 issued by the adjutant general’s branch (Business Standard has a copy). It effectively allocates to each arm a fixed number of vacancies at the rank of colonel, which is the first selection-grade rank in the army when officers command their battalions/regiments, the basic combat unit with 550 to 800 soldiers. The colonel’s vacancies for each arm are calculated by simply adding up the number of units in that arm. For example, the army has about 350 infantry battalions and 60 armoured regiments.
That is where the Machiavellian fiddle starts. Added to the infantry kitty are some 110 units of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Assam Rifles (AR) located in counter-insurgency areas and manned by officers from every arm. Though an internal army study has found that non-infantry officers perform as gallantly as infantry officers in RR/AR, exclusionary conditions were fram-ed to make it almost impossible for armoured corps or mechanised infantry officers to command these units. With this one step, the infantry’s colonel vacancies went up from 350 to 460, a jump of almost 30 per cent.
But that was just the start; this advantage was then multiplied by differentiating command tenures for each arm. The shorter the command tenure, the more quickly the vacancies would arise, and the larger the number of colonels that would be needed from that arm. The infantry, unsurprisingly, got the shortest command tenure of just two-and-a-half years. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that with 460 colonels needed every two-and-a-half years, the infantry must promote some 184 colonels every year.
The influence of two artillery chiefs boosted the number of artillery units. Small units called “light batteries” with less than 300 soldiers, that were always commanded by lieutenant colonels, were elevated to “light regiments” commanded by colonels. The artillery’s command tenure was shortened from three-and-a-half to three years, similarly boosting its colonel vacancies. And departing radically from established military tradition, in which there are just two combat arms — the armoured corps and the infantry — the artillery was effectively promoted from a “combat support arm” to a combat arm. “How can the artillery be designated as a combat arm? They lob shells from tens of kilometres away and rarely encounter the enemy. Of the combat support arms, the engineers have a much better case for being called a combat arm,” says a retired infantry general who prefers to remain unnamed.
The engineers and the signals, the other two combat support arms, were sharply pegged back with their command tenures fixed at four years — a 33 per cent disadvantage to the artillery. The logistics services were discriminated against even more radically, with command tenures fixed at five years. “We would not go to war as Arms/Supporting arms… but as Indian army. ‘The command based model’ expect us (sic) to be fragmented in peace and united in war,” says the lieutenant colonel’s letter to General Singh.
The quotas of colonel vacancies are merely the tip of the iceberg. Beyond this first level of “Mandalisation” are quotas for brigadier rank, which are proportional to the benchmark that was created with colonel vacancies. Another set of quotas has been created in key career courses like the higher command course (for colonels) and the year-long National Defence College course (for brigadiers), both of which are almost mandatory for promotion. An armoured corps or mechanised infantry brigadier, for example, would be lucky to become a major general without doing the NDC course. By restricting the armoured corps and mechanised infantry vacancies in each NDC course to just two each, an annual quota of promotion to major general is effectively applied.
An armoured corps major general explains how this works: “I was subjected four times to quotas. One, while being promoted to colonel; two, for nomination to the higher command course; three, when I was promoted to brigadier; and four, when I was nominated to the NDC.” Says a young infantry lieutenant colonel: “Promotion prospects are 50 per cent higher in the infantry; so why should anyone join the mechanised infantry?”
* * *
“It will all work out even in the long run,” says a senior infantry officer. “Less qualified officers from the infantry and artillery are benefiting today, but it could be the armoured corps that benefits tomorrow.” This glosses over the basic truth: quotas benefit only the incompetent, whether from one arm or another.
Pro-rata proponents admit that meritocracy is desirable but is, in fact, impossible. They suggest that armoured corps and mechanised infantry officers serve in their own environment where patronage networks operate and even average officers are graded outstanding, tilting the promotion playing field in their favour. This argument overlooks the fact that infantry officers, operating in their own environment, similarly have fellow infantrymen all the way up the reporting chains.
General Singh denies there’s any problem. “Pro-rata is a myth created by people who don’t understand the system. A bandwidth (of merit) has been laid down, and all those who are meritorious are taken care of (i.e. promoted). Show me a man who was meritorious, but was not promoted.”
But the defence ministry does not share his sanguinity. So concerned is it at the army’s promotion methodology that it has held up for months the promotion of a set of major generals, while the army answers questions about various anomalies. The result: there is currently no lieutenant general to command the frontline 9 Corps on the Pakistan border, and there’s nobody to relieve the commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lt Gen Ata Hasnain, who has completed his tenure. In contrast to these promotion delays, navy and air force promotion boards, which adhere to fair and well-documented rules, are normally cleared by the ministry within 15 to 20 days.
General Singh blames the current delay on “letters, comments and private confabulations” between lobbyists and the ministry. “Our boards couldn’t have been fairer. There was transparency and absolute fairness.”
Old soldiers are surprised that the infantry and artillery chiefs could implement pro-rata without a consensus within the army. When the matter was discussed in an army commanders’ conference, the army’s highest forum, a respected mechanised infantry officer, Lt Gen H S Panag, thumped the table and asked whether the next step would be to appoint the army chief through quotas!
There is a growing belief across sections of the army, reflected in the lieutenant colonel’s recent letter, that the cohesiveness of the officer corps hangs in the balance. Mid-ranking officers suggest that realistic feedback be sought from the entire spectrum of officers through a direct medium like the army intranet. But the degree of resentment is perhaps not understood in the ivory towers from where the army is run.

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