Date of Birth of Gen. VK Singh, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC

GEN. V. K. SINGH, COAS
AGE CONTROVERSY - SOME MYTHS AND HARD FACTS

1. Ancestral Village: BAPORA in Bhiwani Distt (Haryana)
2. Father: Late Lt. Col Jagat of Rajput Regiment (14 RAJPUT)
3.Date & Place of Birth: 10 May 1951 at MH, Pune
(Fathers record of service and 14 RAJPUT records refer).
4. Schooling: Birla Public School, Pilani (Rajasthan) up to Class X - MARCH 1966

5. Date of Birth Recorded in School Register and School Leaving Certificate - 10 May, 1951
6. Applied for written entrance exam for National Defence Academy (NDA) Khardakwasla as Air Force Entry Cadet for 36 NDA Course commencing 13 July 1966.

1966 MARCH:

DOB wrongly filled in the UPSC entrance form by BS Bhatnagar, erstwhile English teacher at Birla Public School, Pilani as 10 May 1950 instead of 10 May 1951.

Eligible age for entry for 36 NDA course as on 01July1966: 15 Years to 17-1/2 years - Gen. VK Singh eligible for both the ages i.e. 10 May 1951 and 10 May 1950

Matriculation Certificate or Certificate of Date of Birth from his father not attached with the application form pending receipt from Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan/Lt. Col. Jagat Singh (Father). At the time of filling the UPSC application form, Gen. VK Singh was MINOR (14 years Plus) and had possibly signed the form without checking the details with the confidence that all details filled by his teacher would be correct.

Before facing Service Selection Board and entry to NDA, a Certificate from his Fathers Unit (14 RAJPUT) and School Leaving Certificate giving correct Date of Birth (i.e. 10 May 1951) was forwarded to UPSC/appropriate authorities


03 AUG 1966

UPSC, then, queried the Officer as to the anomaly between DOB filled in the UPSC application form and the two certificates subsequently forwarded as at serial 9 above. The query was replied to with confirmation that correct Date of Birth is 10 May 1951, as recorded in School Leaving Certificate and his Fathers service records maintained by his unit (14 RAJPUT). Receipt for above correspondence with UPSC available. Based on the facts mentioned at Serial 10 above and having convinced itself on the correct DOB (10 May 1051) the Officer was given a call for Service Selection Board (SSB) and allowed to join NDA as PROVISIONAL candidate pending receipt/submission of MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE. The UPSC, thereafter, never queried on the issue of DOB confirming that issue has been laid to rest. The Matric Certificate was not submitted at this time since though the results were declared on 13 June 1966, but the Certificate was not issued. However, school had issued Provisional School Leaving Certificate, which mentioned his passing Xth class and DOB as 10 May 1951. The Certificate was accordingly forwarded to appropriate authorities.

The Officer filed a Record of Service particulars form while joining NDA which reflects his DOB as 10 May 1951.His Medical Examination form as an Air Force Candidate reflects 10 May 1951 as his DOB.

The Officer joined Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun after passing out from NDA and was commissioned in Indian Army on 14 June 1970 in Infantry (2 RAJPUT).

14 June 1970

All records maintained by NDA/IMA reflected DOB as 10 May 1951. Based on Service Records maintained at IMA, it issued officer Identity Card to 2Lt VK Singh reflecting this Date of Birth as 10 May 1951 (based on School Leaving Certificate) since Matric Certificate was not submitted by then.(This endorsement could not have been made if IMA records did not hold 10 May 1951 in the officers records of service particulars maintained by them. The officer on commissioning joined 2 RAJPUT on 1970 and filled form No IAFZ-2041 on joining the Unit, which is forwarded to Army HQ AGs Branch (the official Record Holders of all Officers). Even IMA forwarded IAFZ-2041 to AG Branch (10 May 51)

14 June 1970

Here, once again, at Para/Serial 6 of the Form the Officer filled his DOB as 10 MAY 1951.

The Officer attends Infantry Young Officers Course(YO-COURCE-2) at Mhow and returns to the Unit (2 RAJPUT) on April 1971.

Sep 1970 to March 1971

Before reporting back to his Unit, he visits his village and finds the Matric Certificate there. The Matric Certificate was issued by Rajasthan Secondary Board of Education on 13 June 1966 and forwarded to Birla Public School.

Birla Public School forwarded the Matric Certificate at his fathers Unit address (14 RAJPUT). But his father had been posted out of the Unit by then to Branch Recruiting office REWA & thereafter to NCC Narnaul. 14 RAJPUT had accordingly dispatched the certificate to Rewa Rectg Office, who then dispatched it to NCC Narnaul, who further forwarded it to the Officer's ancestral village where his father had moved on retirement. Obviously the Matric Certificate kept lying at his village unattended since no one was residing at his ancestral house since his father had moved out to Bhiwani where he expired. The officer instantly submitted the Original matriculation certificate late to Army HQ (AGs Branch) through his Unit (4 RAJPUT).

April 1971

The Unit had sent the certificate to Army HQ (AGs Branch) who after due verification and updating their records returned the original certificate to the Officer and changed Provisional status to Permanent. Meanwhile, without checking and confirming detailed record of service from Army HQ (AGs Branch) who are the Official record holder and authority on all such matters) Military Secretary Branch (MS) got ARMY LIST reflecting wrong Date of Birth of the Officer as 10 MAY 1950, instead of 1951. Though the Orders on the subject are very clear on the subject, MS Branch failed to verify the Date of Birth of the Officer from official record holder (AGs Branch) and the CGDA (the paying authority) and erroneously and carelessly endorsed 10 May 1950 as the officers DOB in the Army List.

Even when Matric Certificate was received by AGs Branch at Army HQ in April 1971 (within two years of Commissioning of the officer, no effort was made by MS Branch to either correct its records nor verify the same from AGs Branch annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971.

The seeds of main controversy of DOB of Gen VK Singh were sown by the careless attitude and erroneous actions by the MS Branch at this stage which was allowed to persist till 2006 when they first queried the officer on the anomaly in his DOB. (30 years after commissioning -?)

Why at this belated stage- ??

The mistake was even never rectified till date by the MS Branch even when they were in receipt of the Record of Service annually attached with Annual Confidential Report starting from 1971. The officer is required to endorse Form checklist on completion of 20 years of service; the Forms asks have you ever asked for a change in DOB, if so what is your correct DOB?. To which the officer on 30 Nov 1990 reflected NO, my correct DOB is 10.

MAY 1951.

Even then no cognizance of this report was taken to correct records by MS Branch, the FIRST ever query on the anomaly on the officers DOB as reflected by him in his Annual Record of Service as 10 May 1951 and in Army List as 10 May 1950, was made by, then, Military Secretary on 3rd May 2006.

3rd May 2006

The officer has clearly replied that his correct DOB as endorsed in the AGs Branch records and all other service records is 10 May 1951,which is maintained till date. The officer was issued with a certificate by AG MP (5&6) on 17 Oct,2007 that his correct DOB as recorded with them was 10 May 1951.

17 Oct 2007

(The letter signed by AAG of concerned Branch refers)Once again, Additional General (Manpower Planning and Personnel (MP&P) reflected entire details on record of service of the officer confirming DOB at each stage as 10 MAY 1951. The ADG in his letter has concluded that all recorded endorsements in the documents stated above the DOB of Gen VK Singh is 10 MAY 1951.

January 2008

The letter clearly states that Record of Service (IAFZ-2041) of every officer on commissioning is forwarded by IMA/OTA to AG Branch (MP-5/6) at Army HQ. It includes all occurrences during office service. Part-I (Personal Particulars) of this documents is filled-up by IMA/OTA to the extent applicable at the time of commissioning. Para 5 of Part-I states Date of Birth (as recorded by UPSC or in Sheet Roll). Interestingly Date of Birth recorded in this Para 5 of Part I is 10 MAY 1951. Even DOB recorded in all Annual and other Medical Examination Boards is 10 MAY 1951. Once again DG (MP&PS) at Army HQ Lt. Gen. KR Rao in his Inter Office Note dt 30 Jan 2008 in reply to MS Branch service note dt 28 Jan 2008 mentions correct DOB of the Officer as 10 MAY 1951.

30 Jan 2008

Even then MS Branch failed to correct/reconcile its erroneous records of DOB. As per Para 136 of Defence Services Regulations (DSR), DOB recorded in Matric certificate is to be taken as correct DOB and the aberration if any in the Record of Service are to be corrected by the concerned record holding authority. In the instant case the MS Branch failed to rectify their records. The officer replied to MS Branch query of 3rd May 2006 as at ser 24 above on

10th May 2006


Officer clarified that:-

- SSC certificate is the authority of his DOB (10 MAY 1951)
- Had forwarded the SSC certificate to Org 3 (AGs Branch)
- Consequently his Provisional status of Commission was changed to Permanent
- Made efforts in 1985 to correct the Record of DOB in the Army List to MP-5 and was informed that needful would be done.
- Had made another effort in 2002 with MS Branch by sending a photocopy of Matric Certificate to MISO. However, no correction was made in the said DOB erroneously recorded at their end.
- MS Branch, vide their letter of 21 Aug 2006 replied that no change in the DOB is possible as the Rules only permit to do so with in first two years of Service.

21 Aug 2006

MS Branch grossly erred here and misinterpreted the Reconciliation DOB in their Records to Change in DOB. The whole controversy emanates from this misinterpretation of the Rules on the subject and has been allowed to willy nilly or otherwise continue till dates.

October 2007

Even when AGs Branch in October 2007 had clarified and confirmed to MS Branch on the correct DOB and 10 MAY 1951, no action was taken by the latter to rectify the mistake committed by them earlier. In Dec 2007 Min. of Defence asked MS Branch to indicate reasons of recording 10 MAY 1950 as been VK Singhs DOB when he had himself indicated 10 MAY 1951 in his Annual Confidential Records.

14 Dec 2007

MOD queries MS Branch for reasons of recording DOB as 10 May 1950 and asks for conduct of inquiry. MS Branch replied that they had relied upon UPSC application form in which the officer had filled 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB. They also claimed to rely on Army List which they had themselves endorsed with 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB without checking from AGs Branch (Official Record Holder)

20 Dec 2007

The MS Branch once again quoted GOI Office memorandum 21 April 1964 and MoD Memorandum 23 June 1954, under which no change in DOB is to be made after 2 years of commissioning of the officers. Again misinterpretation of Orders since officer was not asking for CHANGE but RECTIFICATION of mistakes committed by them. Once again MS Branch asked officer to send all correspondence relating to his earlier requests for CHANGE of his DOB.

19 Dec 2007

The officer once again replied that he had never asked for a CHANGE in DOB, but CORRECTION of erroneous records at their end based on Matric Certificate submitted to AGs Branch and other related documents/reports (ACRs). Again AG Branch verified that Record of Service received by them from IMA at the time of Commissioning of the officer his DOB recorded is 10 MAY 1951.

Dec 2007

Subsequently on 21 Jan 2008, MS Branch sticking to its previous stand, replied that the DOB mentioned in Army List (10 May 1950) will remain to be correct and no change will be affected. 21 Jan 2008. Once again the Rule of 2 years restriction in change of DOB was quoted continuous case of misinterpretation of the issue at hand and Rules on the subject.

The Officer was pressurized by Gen Deepak Kapoor, the then COAS, to admit 10 MAY 1950 as his DOB and accept it in the interest of Service and other officers whose promotion case files are pending in the Min. of Defence for clearance Through telephonic conversation with COAS he was also assured that once the needful is done the fresh case for correcting his DOB could be effected later.

The Officer accordingly gave this undertaking especially highlighting the same in the Interest of Service, hoping for due justice as the matter would be settled as promised.

24 Jan 2008

MS Branch later in their letter dt 28 Jan 2008 made reference of the officer letter saying doubts on the DOB still remain unanswered. It also referred MOD request to carry out detailed inquiry to find out correct DOB in consultation with AGs Branch. HOWEVER, NO INQUIRY WAS CONDUCTED AND NOTING ON THE CASE WAS FOUND SAYING, INQUIRY NOT TO BE CONDUCTED.

Subsequently the Officer in his letter dt 01 July 2008 addressed to COAS, Gen. Deepak Kapoor requesting for Justice to be done in his case and enquired into the constraints by MS Branch which compelled them to maintain his DOB as 10 MAY 1950 despite submitting SSC Certificate in 1974 which recorded 10 MAY 1951 as his DOB.

01 July 2008

It was mentioned in the officers letter that when he met Lt.Gen. Khare and Gen. Gangadharan of the MS Brnach in 2006 and 2007 respectively, he was assured that all necessary reconciliations with regard to the clarification his DOB would be carried out. The officer then issued a letter dt Feb 2009 to MS Branch in response to their letter dt. 15 Jan 2009 to him which had quoted in their letter that verification process of DOB by MS Branch did not require Matriculation Certificate, while the same is an accepted authority for the same.

03 June 2009

The officer pointed out that whereas Matric Certificate was an authority, then what is the procedure for MS Branch to verify the DOB? MS Branch asserted that it was not responsible to verify the age (DOB) as it was the duty of AG Branch. Why did MS Branch not reconcile the facts?

15 Jan 2009

On 25th May 2011 AGs Branch, once again, certified the DOB of the officer as 10 MAY 1951.

25 May 11

- RTI dt. 25 Oct 2010 filed by Dr. Kamal Tiwari in MOD for obtaining information on the subject.
14 Feb 2011
- Min. of Law opined &' confirmed DOB as 10 MAY 1951 (on 14 Feb 2011).
- Min. of Def vide their letter dt. 8 May 2011 informed the RTI querist that DOB of the officer in High School Certificate and Records of AG Branch at Army HQ was same (10 MAY 1951)

08 May 2011

In the same reply Law Ministry informed that there was Omission in Core Branch (MS Branch) and the Ministry of Law & Justice had advised for the necessary corrections.

But, surprisingly the matter was once again referred to Attorney General of India and the Law Ministry. The News Media has since reported that now Attorney General and Law & Justice Minister have reversed their earlier opinion saying that now the DOB of Gen. VK Singh is 10 MAY 1950. The entire case smacks of a deeper plot to malign the image of Chief of Indian Army. In spite of solid and legal proof of his DOB, the persons behind the scene are not permitting the corrections be made in his DOB that MS Branch had no system for verification of the DOB. He also intimated that he had given acceptance to the DOB (!0 MAY 1950) in good faith at the behest of COAS and not in agreement with the conclusion of the said MS Branch. Surprisingly MS Branch responded vide their letter dt 03 June 2009 that THEY WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFICATION OF DOB AS THE SAME WAS CHARTERED AS THE DUTIES OF AGs BRANCH

May be it is an indirect effort to malign the Government to tarnish the image of this fine institution INDIAN ARMY. Ramifications of not taking the issue to rightful conclusion based on justified action are grave, especially when our enemies are eagerly waiting to dismantle and demoralize our Armed Forces.

The Print Media and Electronic Media, so far, have reflected the issue in bits and pieces without giving the complete picture, which has left the masses in doubt so serious that some of them have even raised eyebrows on the personal integrity of the Army Chief. Immediate efforts towards clearing all such misunderstandings and doubts and to let the people judge the case on the merits of the case and to know from the facts enumerated above that there are some vested powers, who are hell bent to destroy the image of our Army Chief and promote some gullible and pliable personalities for the post, are required.

Important to Note:-

The aberration in DOB was first racked- up when Gen. J.J. Singh was COAS (2006). Interestingly planning for TWO DOWN COAS commences when a Maj. Gen. is approved for Lt. Gen. (So called LINE OF SUCCESSION after Gen. V.K. Singh drawn then, and has since been talked about and quoted today officially.
General Deepak Kapoor, the previous COAS followed the line for vested interests and vigorously pursued the issue at each stage and made all-out efforts to malign and belittle Gen. V.K. Singh before his being considered as COAS, and now when so called LINE OF SUCCESSION is being firmed-in, the matter has hit the headlines.
Lt. Gen. Avdhesh Prakash, the then, Military Secretary vehemently pursued the agenda of his Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor.

Hard facts can’t be overlooked...

The obstinate mule headed approach, red tape of MS branch who deal with careers & promotions & the bureaucrats who run the country is obvious.

If a CVC etc. can approach the courts for legal redress, why cannot a Service Chief? He is also a citizen of India, like anybody else and must fight the bureaucracy (read autocracy) till last-man-last-round. We have all borne the brunt of bureaucracy/MS Branch at some time in our careers.

Such systematic disease can only be cured by clean surgical procedure.

All the Chief's Men: Quotas rule promotions in a “Mandalised” Army

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 14th Jan 12

A recent letter, boldly written by a serving lieutenant colonel to the army chief, General V K Singh says: “PROFESSIONAL DISCRIMINATION is upgrading (sic) into SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION. The formidable INDIAN ARMY is developing cracks. What the enemy would have loved to foster, is happening on its own.”

Says a senior officer of the mechanised forces who was recently promoted, but sees equally competent compatriots being overtaken by lesser officers: “The Indian army has been effectively Mandalised. The traditional meritocracy of senior rank has given way to a shoddy system of quotas that is placing unconfident and incompetent officers to command troops in battle.”

* * *

People sometimes wonder what drives soldiers in the face of death. The answer, surprisingly, is not patriotism, religion, discipline, bloodlust, or a quest for glory. Instead, most soldiers affirm that a shared brotherhood with their comrades is what drives them through mortal danger. The ones who die do so in the belief that death is better than besmirching the legacy of their unit or sub-unit.

“Soldiers live and die for the name of their unit alone,” says Brigadier Virendar Singh who led the assault on the 21,000-feet-high Bana Post above the Siachen Glacier in 1987, one of India’s most stirring military exploits.

Reflecting this philosophy, combat units are structured around the regimental system. Combat arms, which include the infantry (foot soldiers) and the armoured corps (tank men), are all organised into regiments or groups. These include legends like the Gurkha regiment, the Sikh Light Infantry and the Brigade of Guards. The armoured corps has a plethora of famous regiments like 4 Horse, Skinner’s Horse, and 3rd Cavalry.

Officers and jawans go straight from initial training into their unit, a tightly-bonded fraternity of 550 to 800 men. For the duration of their field service, they serve with that same unit, imbibing its ethos and character. Their uniform bears its distinctive symbols — cap badges, shoulder titles, belts, flashes and lanyards — which reaffirm their identity. They soak in, and revel in, their unit’s history, its battle honours and the personalities that it produced.

But the iron framework of the regimental system has now morphed into a monster that is ripping apart the fabric of the army as a whole. The legitimate aim of the regimental system — galvanising esprit de corps in combat units — has been short-sightedly extended into the competition for promotions and postings. Over the preceding decade, a string of army chiefs from two arms — the infantry and the artillery — have fiddled with promotion policies to boost the career prospects of officers from their arms. But every winner also creates a loser in the zero-sum contest to fill a very limited number of promotion vacancies. The losers in this divisive move are the armoured corps and the mechanised infantry, arms that have traditionally produced a high share of the army’s generals. Also on the losing side are combat support arms like the engineers and signals and the logistical services that sustain the combat soldiers.

The tool that has unfairly boosted the prospects of infantry and artillery officers is referred to within the army as “pro-rata” — a Mandal-Commission-style directive that guarantees each arm a fixed number of promotion vacancies, regardless of merit. Pro-rata began in 2002 under an artillery chief, General S Padmanabhan, and was consolidated by his successors: General N C Vij (infantry), General J J Singh (infantry) and General Deepak Kapoor (artillery). In 2009, when General Kapoor was the army chief, this institutionally-debilitating move was translated into formal policy.

Pro-rata rejects the widely accepted belief that senior rank must be awarded on merit, not on quota. Senior officers hold on to their regimental links, which get translated at senior rank into patrimonial ties.

Consider the appointments made by the current army chief, General Singh, from his Rajput Regiment. While Singh has been a relatively fair chief, he has posted officers from the regiment to practically every crucial appointment: the deputy chief of army staff, the director general of military operations, the adjutant general (responsible for discipline and manpower planning), the military secretary who posts and promotes officers, and the additional director general of administration & coordination. In addition, Rajput officers were placed at the head of key formations around Delhi: the Delhi Area which controls military installations around the capital, and the Meerut-based 22 Infantry Division.

* * *

Institutionalising the pro-rata system is letter number 08176/Est/POLICY/MP-2 issued by the adjutant general’s branch (Business Standard has a copy). It effectively allocates to each arm a fixed number of vacancies at the rank of colonel, which is the first selection-grade rank in the army when officers command their battalions/regiments, the basic combat unit with 550 to 800 soldiers. The colonel’s vacancies for each arm are calculated by simply adding up the number of units in that arm. For example, the army has about 350 infantry battalions and 60 armoured regiments.

That is where the Machiavellian fiddle starts. Added to the infantry kitty are some 110 units of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and Assam Rifles (AR) located in counter-insurgency areas and manned by officers from every arm. Though an internal army study has found that non-infantry officers perform as gallantly as infantry officers in RR/AR, exclusionary conditions were fram-ed to make it almost impossible for armoured corps or mechanised infantry officers to command these units. With this one step, the infantry’s colonel vacancies went up from 350 to 460, a jump of almost 30 per cent.

But that was just the start; this advantage was then multiplied by differentiating command tenures for each arm. The shorter the command tenure, the more quickly the vacancies would arise, and the larger the number of colonels that would be needed from that arm. The infantry, unsurprisingly, got the shortest command tenure of just two-and-a-half years. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that with 460 colonels needed every two-and-a-half years, the infantry must promote some 184 colonels every year.

The influence of two artillery chiefs boosted the number of artillery units. Small units called “light batteries” with less than 300 soldiers, that were always commanded by lieutenant colonels, were elevated to “light regiments” commanded by colonels. The artillery’s command tenure was shortened from three-and-a-half to three years, similarly boosting its colonel vacancies. And departing radically from established military tradition, in which there are just two combat arms — the armoured corps and the infantry — the artillery was effectively promoted from a “combat support arm” to a combat arm. “How can the artillery be designated as a combat arm? They lob shells from tens of kilometres away and rarely encounter the enemy. Of the combat support arms, the engineers have a much better case for being called a combat arm,” says a retired infantry general who prefers to remain unnamed.

The engineers and the signals, the other two combat support arms, were sharply pegged back with their command tenures fixed at four years — a 33 per cent disadvantage to the artillery. The logistics services were discriminated against even more radically, with command tenures fixed at five years. “We would not go to war as Arms/Supporting arms… but as Indian army. ‘The command based model’ expect us (sic) to be fragmented in peace and united in war,” says the lieutenant colonel’s letter to General Singh.

The quotas of colonel vacancies are merely the tip of the iceberg. Beyond this first level of “Mandalisation” are quotas for brigadier rank, which are proportional to the benchmark that was created with colonel vacancies. Another set of quotas has been created in key career courses like the higher command course (for colonels) and the year-long National Defence College course (for brigadiers), both of which are almost mandatory for promotion. An armoured corps or mechanised infantry brigadier, for example, would be lucky to become a major general without doing the NDC course. By restricting the armoured corps and mechanised infantry vacancies in each NDC course to just two each, an annual quota of promotion to major general is effectively applied.

An armoured corps major general explains how this works: “I was subjected four times to quotas. One, while being promoted to colonel; two, for nomination to the higher command course; three, when I was promoted to brigadier; and four, when I was nominated to the NDC.” Says a young infantry lieutenant colonel: “Promotion prospects are 50 per cent higher in the infantry; so why should anyone join the mechanised infantry?”

* * *

“It will all work out even in the long run,” says a senior infantry officer. “Less qualified officers from the infantry and artillery are benefiting today, but it could be the armoured corps that benefits tomorrow.” This glosses over the basic truth: quotas benefit only the incompetent, whether from one arm or another.

Pro-rata proponents admit that meritocracy is desirable but is, in fact, impossible. They suggest that armoured corps and mechanised infantry officers serve in their own environment where patronage networks operate and even average officers are graded outstanding, tilting the promotion playing field in their favour. This argument overlooks the fact that infantry officers, operating in their own environment, similarly have fellow infantrymen all the way up the reporting chains.

General Singh denies there’s any problem. “Pro-rata is a myth created by people who don’t understand the system. A bandwidth (of merit) has been laid down, and all those who are meritorious are taken care of (i.e. promoted). Show me a man who was meritorious, but was not promoted.”

But the defence ministry does not share his sanguinity. So concerned is it at the army’s promotion methodology that it has held up for months the promotion of a set of major generals, while the army answers questions about various anomalies. The result: there is currently no lieutenant general to command the frontline 9 Corps on the Pakistan border, and there’s nobody to relieve the commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lt Gen Ata Hasnain, who has completed his tenure. In contrast to these promotion delays, navy and air force promotion boards, which adhere to fair and well-documented rules, are normally cleared by the ministry within 15 to 20 days.

General Singh blames the current delay on “letters, comments and private confabulations” between lobbyists and the ministry. “Our boards couldn’t have been fairer. There was transparency and absolute fairness.”

Old soldiers are surprised that the infantry and artillery chiefs could implement pro-rata without a consensus within the army. When the matter was discussed in an army commanders’ conference, the army’s highest forum, a respected mechanised infantry officer, Lt Gen H S Panag, thumped the table and asked whether the next step would be to appoint the army chief through quotas!

There is a growing belief across sections of the army, reflected in the lieutenant colonel’s recent letter, that the cohesiveness of the officer corps hangs in the balance. Mid-ranking officers suggest that realistic feedback be sought from the entire spectrum of officers through a direct medium like the army intranet. But the degree of resentment is perhaps not understood in the ivory towers from where the army is run.